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Abstract
Secure protocol is a vital guarantee in all kinds of communication network environment. Designing on authenticated
key exchange protocols is a hotspot in the field of information security at present, and the related theories have been
increasingly mature. However, there is still scarcely any appropriate security protocol to guarantee the
communication security of wireless body area networks (WBANs). In this paper, according to the standards on WBAN,
we define a layered network model in accordance with the definition of two-hop star network topology firstly. In line
with this model, we put forward two new authenticated key exchange protocols based on symmetric cryptosystem,
which are suitable for WBAN application scenario. The proposed protocols support the selective authentication
between nodes in WBAN. Simultaneously, two pairs of session key are generated efficiently and succinctly in each
certification process. Finally, after security analyzing and performance evaluating demonstrate that the proposed key
agreement protocols are proved to meet desired security properties with light computation and communication
overhead. The proposed protocols provide a primitive to develop efficient and secure WBAN systems.
Keywords: Security protocol; Wireless body area network; BAN logic; AES
1 Introduction
Authenticated key exchange protocols are important and
have been widely applied in network communication. By
a pre-registration, two communication parties share a
secret symmetric key with a trusted server correspond-
ingly. When the two participants try to exchange any
information with authentication property confidentially
in an insecure environment, they must be in agreement
on a new secret session key by the help of a server.
This kind of key exchange method is called three-party
authenticated key exchange (3PAKE), and the 3PAKE pro-
tocols typically are employed for mutual authentication
and secure communication in various applications.
A good design of 3PAKE protocols should meet various
security requirements of different applications, which are
described as follows.
• Mutual authentication: The participants of protocols
should be authenticated by the server and also they
must be authenticated each other by themselves.
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• Session key security: The agreed session key should
only be known by parties who participate in
communication process.
• Perfect forward secrecy: Perfect forward secrecy is
the property that a session key derived from a set of
long-term keys will not be compromised if one of the
long-term key is compromised in the future.
In recent years, many three-party authenticated key
exchange protocols have been proposed [1–10] in recent
years. Yeh et al. [4] proposed two 3PAKE protocols for
secure communication over a public network. One was a
plaintext-equivalent authentication protocol and the other
was a verifier-based authentication protocol. Lee et al. [8]
proposed an improved encrypted key exchange protocol
developed by Yeh’s scheme. They claimed that the pro-
posed protocols had the same computation complexity
as Yeh’s protocol. In [2] and [6], the server’s public keys
were both needed in their schemes. Lu and Cao [5] pro-
posed a new simple three-party password-based authen-
ticated key exchange protocol (S-3PAKE) which did not
require any server’s public key. Guo et al. [11] found that
S-3PAKE in [5] was vulnerable to a kind of man-in-the-
middle attack that exploited an authentication flaw in the
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protocol and is subject to the undetectable online dic-
tionary attack. Then, they have provided an improved
version. Kim and Choi [12] proposed another improved
version of S-3PAKE against the online password guess-
ing attack. However, both of the two improved versions in
[11] and [12] had more computation cost than the original
S-3PAKE protocol though they are more secure.
With efficiency and security in consideration, the num-
ber of protocol execution steps and the complexity of
cryptographic operations have been used to measure the
performance of the existing 3PAKE schemes. Different
from the above existing 3PAKE protocols with less consid-
eration of computation cost, Huang [7] proposed a 3PAKE
protocol in five steps without improving the server’s pub-
lic key. In [1–3], the authors presented several symmetric
key-based authenticated key exchange protocols, respec-
tively. In order to further improve the efficiency of 3PAKE
protocols, in this paper, we propose two new efficient
three-party authenticated key exchange protocols with
one-time key for WBANs especially, which achieve more
security properties as Huang’s scheme claimed.
WBAN is the embranchment of wireless sensor net-
work, which can benefit to monitor and improve health
conditions of people, surveillance of old age, and handi-
capped people [13]. It can further improve quality of life
by monitoring and examining the vital signs (e.g., tem-
perature, blood pressure, etc.) of healthy people to avoid
future health problems. The study on wireless body area
network is in a fledging period at present, meanwhile IEEE
raised 802.15.6 standard for wireless body area network in
2012, which regulates the technical requirements in each
layers ofWBAN.WBANs include various types ofmedical
and non-medical sensors equipped in and on human bod-
ies to monitor different biological information of people.
All BAN nodes send monitored data to a BAN controller.
In WBANs, each BN with biosensors must be operated
with extremely stringent constrains, especially implanted
BAN nodes. So, simplicity is an important factor in devis-
ing a new protocol for WBANs. Design considerations
for efficient key exchange protocols for WBANs are as
follows:
• The proposed key agreement protocol should not
require lots of energy and memory because sensor
nodes are already resource constraints.
• It must suit the topology structure of wireless body
area network.
• Communication messages should be of low
redundancy rate and minimum message exchange
between the nodes.
Possible attacks in wireless channel (such as replay-
ing attack, eavesdropping attack, denial of service attack,
Byzantine attack, etc.) have raised concerns of users and
medical service providers. The detail security require-
ments of WBANs are introduced in [14] that is not
altogether different from general WSNs.
Star topology is largely used in the WBANs, which is
simple and easy to control. In this topology, it is possible
to partition the sensor nodes according to their location:
on the head; on the torso; and on the limbs [15]. However,
it will impose higher energy costs for communications
involving nodes that are distant from the BAN Network
Controller. For these nodes, we could consider using relay
nodes. Till date, there are very few security protocols
[16–18] designed for this kind of network topology in
WBANs.
In this paper, the main contributions of our work can be
summarized as follows:
• We propose two novel three-party authenticated key
exchange protocols between controller node and
sensor nodes in different situations. Due to the
calculation ability and the storage capacity of sensor
nodes, new protocols are specially based on
symmetric cryptography.
• The BAN logic formal verification tool has been
employed in aid design of 3PAKE protocol for
authentication and security verification.
• The quantified performance analysis on the proposed
3PAKE protocols is conducted.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
2 briefly introduces the network model of WBANs. In
Section 3, two three-party key exchanged protocols are
proposed in different application scenarios, namely nor-
mal situation and critical or special situation. Section
4 presents the formal demonstration by BAN logic and
security analysis of the new protocols. The performance
comparisons between proposed protocols and others are
conducted in Section 5. Finally, conclusion is drawn in
Section 6.
2 Networkmodel of the wireless body area
network
WBAN is a special branch of the wireless sensor network.
It is a human body-centered communication network [19],
consisting of body-related elements, including devices
such as sensors distributed within and deployed around
the human body. Through WBAN, people can transfer
data of intracorporal sensors to the terminal equipments
taken along, implement real-time health monitoring and
auxiliary diagnosis of disease further for the patients
[20], and meanwhile realize the network interconnection
within the scope of human and so forth.
The 802.15.6 standard onWBAN gives out the topology
model of such net, the two-hop star topology, composed
by a hub node and several descendants, the number of
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which ranges from several to dozens. Here, except the hub,
we differentiate the nodes as primary node and secondary
node logically while the nodes have the same attribute.
The affiliation of the nodes is shown in Fig. 1. The link
hub-S1-S11 means the two-hop connection between the
hub and secondary node S11, and hub-S2-S21 means the
two-hop connection between the hub and secondary node
S21.
Considering the net as a two-tier architecture, the con-
trol node (hub) is linked together with the primary sensor
node S1, S2 · · · Sn logically so as to transmit data. Simul-
taneously, a portion of primary nodes Si are connected
with the corresponding secondary nodes Si1 in the second
layer. Here, actually, the primary node plays the rule of
relay node. In the initial condition, authentication process
of each node should be conducted at the first place, before
the session key is generated. It requires the adoption of
authentication and key exchange protocol.
3 New authenticated key exchange protocols for
wireless body area network
In this section, we give the description of two proposed
protocols using two-hop star topology. The protocols are
explained in two different application scenarios. For the
sake of simplicity, we make S denote the control node and
B, C, D represent the primary nodes respectively, with A
representing a secondary node. In the initial state, the con-
trol node S keeps the pre-shared key Kbs with primary
node B, and Kcs with C, also Kds with D, S shares the
pre-shared key Kas with secondary nodes A identically.
3.1 Formalizing description of protocol I
In normal cases, the normal nodes periodically collect
data from sensor nodes in WBANs and then send these
data to the hub. If secondary node is near enough to the
hub, it can establish connection with the hub directly. If
not, it has to find a primary node as a relay to complete
the connection.
Protocol I begins with a message broadcasted by a
secondary node A. After receiving the message from A,
the adjacent node B, C, D generates encrypted message
respectively according to the received message, then send
it to the control node S. Subsequently, S determines which
primary node is appropriate to be connected with node A.
Assuming that B is the most appropriate one, the protocol
will accomplish the authentication between S andA, S and
B, as well as A and B, respectively, and generate a session
key namedKEY between S and B, session key Kab between
A and B correspondingly. At the same time, S replies to C,
D to inform about the connection failure. Authentication
flow diagram is shown in Fig. 2.
The formalizing description of protocol I:
Message1: A broadcast: A, Na
Message2: B−→S: B, {A, B, Na, Nb}Kbs
Message3: S−→B: {B, Na, Kab}Kas , {A, Nb, Kab, KEY}Kbs
Message3’: S−→C: {Nc, text}Kcs
Message4: B−→A: {B, Na, Kab}Kas , {Na, Nb}Kab
Message5: A−→B: {Nb}Kab
The analysis of the protocol I:
(1) The secondary node A, which is supposed to access
to the network for authentication, broadcasts
Message 1 including its own identifier A and
generates a random number Na. After receiving the
broadcasted message, B, C, D sends Message 2 to S.
(2) B sends a message encrypted with the pre-shared key
Kbs to S, which contains identifier A, random Na,
identifier B, and random number Nb generated by
node B. Node C, D also sends the same type of
messages.
(3) After receiving the request messages sent by primary
nodes, S decrypts the messages by pre-shared key.
Noticing that it is secondary node A that wants to be
authenticated to join the network, S determines the
most suitable primary node to be connected with A
and sends Message 3 to the right node B as a reply,
meanwhile S sends Message 3’ to C, D. Message 3
involves {B,Na,Kab} encrypted with Kas and
{A,Nb,Kab,KEY } encrypted with Kbs. Among them,
Fig. 1 The structure of two-hop star topology of wireless body area network
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Fig. 2 The flow chart of the certification process of protocol I
Kab is the session key for A and B generated by S, and
KEY is the session key between B and S generated by
S.
(4) After receiving Message 3, B decrypts the message
with Kbs and gets the session KEY and Kab then
encrypts the random number Na,Nb with Kab,
together with {B,Na,Kab}Kas and forwards them to
node A. At the same time, node C, D receives the
replied messages from S and knows that it is unable
to connect with A.
(5) After receiving the previous message, A decrypts
message {B,Na,Kab}Kas with Kas firstly to obtain the
session key Kab, then decrypts message {Na,Nb}Kab
with Kab to get two random numbers Na and Nb,
and finally verifies whether they are same. If so, A
sends Nb encrypted with Kab to B, otherwise the
authentication fails.
(6) After receiving the message from node A, node B
tests whether the assumed Nb is identical with the
original one, if so it shows that node A has received
the correct session key, then end the protocol.
3.2 Formalizing description of protocol II
In some special cases, the primary node and the sec-
ondary node must work together to analyze the data
collected from the human body, for example, measuring
the blood circulation system. The primary node measures
blood pressure, while the secondary node measures blood
oxygen. Each primary node measuring blood pressure is
connected to a secondary node measuring blood oxy-
gen. That is to say, whenever a primary node broadcasts
requirements, there must be a synergistic secondary node
in response. The protocol II is proposed for this kind of
special application cases.
The primary node B broadcasts a message first, and
then the corresponding coordination secondary node A
generates an encrypted message and sends it to the pri-
mary node B after receiving the broadcast message. On
receiving message from node A, node B attaches its own
information and encrypts all of them, then sends them to
the control node S. S decrypts and certificates the received
message. If the message is proved correctly, S sends the
feedback information which contains the session keys to
node B, such as KAB between node A and node B and KBS
between node S and node B. Node B sends the message
which includes KAB to A, and A gives a reply to node B
after receiving and confirming it correctly. Authentication
flow chart is shown in Fig. 3.
The formalizing description of protocol II:
Message1: B broadcast: B, Nb
Message2: A−→B: A,Na,Nb, {A,B,Na}Kas
Message3: B−→S: B, {{A,Na,B}Kas ,A,Nb}Kbs
Message4: S−→B: {A,Nb,KAB,KBS}Kbs , {Na,B,KAB}Kas
Message5: B−→A: {Na,B,KAB}Kas , {Nb}KAB
Message6: A−→B: {Nb + 1}KAB
The analysis of the protocol II:
(1) The primary node B broadcasts its own identifier B
and generates a random number Nb.
(2) The secondary node A which cooperates with node B
sends a message, which contains plain text identifier
A, random Na, Nb, identifier B, and identifier A,
identifier B, random Na encrypted with the
pre-shared key Kas.
(3) After receiving the messages sent by secondary nodes
A, B encrypts the encrypted message {A,B,Na}Kas
and identifier A, random Nb with pre-shared key Kbs,
along with plain text identifier B, and sends them to
the control node S.
(4) After receiving Message 3, S decrypts the message
and verifies it. If correct, S generates the session key
KBS between S and B, and session key KAB, between
A and B. S uses Kbs to encrypt A, Nb, KAB, and KBS
and uses Kas to encrypt B, Na and KAB, then send
them to node B.
(5) After receiving the previous message and decrypting
the first part, node B uses Kbs to get session key KBS
Fig. 3 The flow chart of the certification process of protocol II
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and KAB, uses KAB to encrypt Nb, and sends node A
the message {Na,B,KAB}Kas .
(6) After receiving the message from node B, A decrypts
the front part of the message and uses Kas to get KAB,
random number and identifier, then verifies if the
characteristic is right. If so, node A decrypts the
second part and uses the new received session key
KAB to get Nb. If the received Nb is the same with
original one generated by node B, A sends Nb + 1
encrypted with KAB to node B.
(7) After receiving the message, node B decrypts it to get
Nb + 1, then has Nb + 1minus one, and checks if it
is the same with the random Nb generated in the first
step. If so, the protocol performs successfully,
otherwise the authentication fails.
Primary and secondary nodes are synergistic, that is to
say, the primary node sends messages to the control node
S while the secondary node sends messages by virtue of
primary nodes at the same time. After the protocol com-
pletes initialization and certification, the primary node B
will send Message 2 to control node S, and secondary
node A will send Message 1 to S. Simultaneously, node A
encrypts Message 1 with session key KAB and sends the
original message to node B. B decrypts Message 1 with
KAB concatenate Message 2 and encrypts them with KBS
then sends the original message to S. Finally, S decrypts
messages with KBS and obtains Message 1 and Message 2.
4 Security analysis
Security analysis is an important way of detecting pos-
sible security flaws in security protocols. In this section,
we give both the formalization analysis by BAN logic and
non-formalization analysis of the proposed protocols.
4.1 Formal analysis
The two kinds of authenticated key exchange protocols
are testified by the celebrated BAN logic in this subsec-
tion. The authentication logic is one of the most com-
monly used analysis tools of cryptographic protocols.
BAN logic [21, 22] has not only revealed lots of flaws
of famous protocols but also found the redundancy of
many protocols. In BAN logic, messages are being ideal-
ized as formulas in the first place. After that, the initial
state assumptions are defined as the case may be. Then, by
making use of the known conditions and the logic regula-
tions, it is reasonable to judge and to ratiocinate whether
the protocols meet the goals or not.
4.1.1 Logical symbol
Below are logical symbols of BAN logic used in this paper:
1. P, Q: subjects, those are the principles participant in
the protocol
2. X: message
3. K: secret key
4. {X}K: message X is encrypted with K
5. P| ≡Q: P believes Q
6. PX: P has received message X
7. P| ∼ X: P said X
8. Q⇒X: Q has the jurisdiction to X
9. (X): X is fresh
10. P K←→Q: K is the common pre-share key of P and Q
4.1.2 Inference rule
BAN logic contains message-meaning rules, nonce-
verification rule, jurisdiction rules, and so forth. The
messages above the horizontal line are known conditions
while below line are the results deduced from the known
conditions.
1. Message-meaning rules: P shares the secret key K
with Q. If P receives a message X encrypted with K ,
then P believes that Q has sent X.
M1 : P| ≡ P
K←→ Q,P  {X}KX
P| ≡ Q| ∼ X
2. Nonce-verification rule: if P believes that message X
is fresh and believes that Q has sent X, then P
believes that Q believes X.
N1 : P| ≡ (X),P| ≡ Q| ∼ XP| ≡ Q| ≡ X
3. Jurisdiction rules: if P believes Q has sent message X,
and P believes Q believes X, then P believes X.
J1 : P| ≡ Q ⇒ X,P| ≡ Q| ≡ XP| ≡ X
4. Belief-joint rules: if P believes X and Y , then P
believes messages of a cascade of X and Y ; if P
believes that Q believes messages of a cascade of X
and Y , then P believes Q believes X or Y ; if P believes
that Q has said X and Y , then P believes Q has said X
or Y ; if P believes the message of a cascade of X and
Y , then P believes X or Y .
B1 : P| ≡ X,P| ≡ YP| ≡ (X,Y ) B2 :
P| ≡ Q| ≡ (X,Y )
P| ≡ Q| ≡ Y
B3 : P| ≡ Q| ∼ (X,Y )P| ≡ Q| ∼ X B4 :
P| ≡ (X,Y )
P| ≡ X
5. Freshness-joint rule: if P believes that X is fresh, P
believes the entire message that cascade with X is
fresh.
F1 : P| ≡ (X)P| ≡ (X,Y )
6. Reception rules: if P receives messages of a cascade of
X and Y , we consider P receives X or Y ; if P receives
the connection of formula of X and Y , we consider P
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receives X or Y ; P shares secret key K with Q. If P
receives message X encrypted with K , we can infer
that P receives X.
R1 : P  (X,Y )P  X R2 :
P < X >Y
P  X
R3 : P| ≡ P
K←→ Q,P  {X}K
P  X
7. Additional rules: secret key K is fresh. If P receives
message X encrypted with K and P believes P shares
secret key K with Q, we can infer that P believes Q
has sent message X, and P believes Q believes P
shares secret key K with Q.
(K),P  {X}K ,P| ≡ P K←→ Q
P| ≡ P| ∼ X,P| ≡ Q| ≡ P K←→ Q
4.1.3 The deduction of protocol I
(1) Idealization
• MS2 : B → S, B, {A,B,Na,Nb}Kbs• MS3 : S → B, {Na,B,Kab}Kas , {A,Nb,Kab,KEY }Kbs• MS4 : B → A, {B,Na,Kab}Kas , {Na,Nb}Kab• MS5 : A → B, {Nb}Kab
The idealization of messages1 is omitted since it does
not contribute to the logical properties of the protocol.
(2) Initial state assumptions
The initial state assumptions of S are:
1. S| ≡ S Kas←→ A
2. S| ≡ S Kbs←→ B
3. S ⇒ KEY
4. S ⇒ Kab
The initial state assumptions of B are:
1. B| ≡ B Kbs←→ S
2. S| ≡ (Nb)
3. B| ≡ S| ⇒ B KEY←→ S
4. B| ≡ S| ⇒ A Kab←→ B
The initial state assumptions of A are:
1. A| ≡ A Kas←→ S
2. A| ≡ S| ⇒ A Kab←→ B







































(4) Final faith After the protocol runs successfully, it
should achieve the following certification targets.
- S and B realize two-way authentication
S| ≡ B| ∼ XB
B| ≡ S| ∼ XS (XS and XB are the messages generated
by S and B)
- B and A realize two-way authentication
B| ≡ A| ∼ XA
A| ≡ B| ∼ XB (XA and XB are the messages generated
by A and B)
- Using two-way authentication to negotiate shared
secret key
B| ≡ B KEY←→ S B| ≡ S| ≡ B KEY←→
S
B| ≡ B Kab←→ A B| ≡ A| ≡ B Kab←→
A











2. B|≡S|∼{A,Nb,Kab,KEY }B|≡S|∼(KEY ) (B3)
3. B|≡S|∼(KEY ),B|≡S|⇒KEYB|≡KEY (J)
4. B|≡S|∼{A,Nb,Kab,KEY }B|≡S|∼(Kab) (B3)
5. B|≡S|∼(Kab),B|≡S|⇒KabB|≡Kab (J)
6. B|≡(Nb)B|≡{A,Nb,Kab,KEY } (F1)
7. B|≡S|∼{A,Nb,Kab,KEY },B|≡{A,Nb,Kab,KEY }B|≡S|≡{A,Nb,Kab,KEY } (N1)
8. B|≡S|≡{A,Nb,Kab,KEY }B|≡S|≡KEY (B2)














From the above derivation, we can draw the following
conclusions: B has the KEY and believes that it is shared
with S; B has the Kab and believes that it is shared with A;
A has the Kab and believes that it is shared with B; S and
B realize two-way authentication; B and A realize two-way
authentication.
4.1.4 The deduction of protocol II
(1) Idealization
• MS2 : A → B, {A,B,Na}Kas , A, Na, Nb• MS3 : B → S, B, {{A,Na,B}Kas ,Nb,A}Kbs• MS4 : S → B, {A,Nb,KAB,KBS}Kbs , {Na,B,KAB}Kas• MS5 : B → A, {Na,B,KAB}Kas , {Nb}KAB• MS6 : A → B, {Nb + 1}KAB
The idealization of Message 1 and part of Message 2
are omitted since it does not contribute to the logical
properties of the protocol.
(2) Initial state assumptions
The initial state assumptions of S are:
1. S| ≡ S Kas←→ A
2. S| ≡ S Kbs←→ B
3. S ⇒ KBS
4. S ⇒ KAB
The initial state assumptions of B are:
1. B| ≡ B Kbs←→ S
2. S| ≡ (Nb)
3. B| ≡ S| ⇒ B KBS←→ S
4. B| ≡ S| ⇒ A KAB←→ B
The initial state assumptions of A are:
1. A| ≡ A Kas←→ S
2. A| ≡ S| ⇒ A KAB←→ B




3: B {Nb,A KAB←→ B, (A KAB←→ B), B KBS←→ S, (B KBS←→ S)
}Kbs , {Na,A
KAB←→ B, (A KAB←→ B)}Kas
4: A {Na,A KAB←→ B, (A KAB←→ B)}Kas ,{Nb}KAB
5: B{Nb+1}KAB
(4) Final faith
After the protocol runs successfully, it should achieve
the following certification targets.
- S and B realize two-way authentication
S| ≡ B| ∼ XB
B| ≡ S| ∼ XS (XS and XB are the messages generated
by S and B)
- B and A realize two-way authentication
B| ≡ A| ∼ XA
A| ≡ B| ∼ XB (XA and XB are the messages generated
by A and B)
- Using two-way authentication to negotiate shared
secret key
B| ≡ B KBS←→ S B| ≡ S| ≡ B KBS←→
S
B| ≡ B KAB←→ A B| ≡ A| ≡ B KAB←→
A
































From the above derivation, we can draw the following
conclusions: B has the KBS and believes that it is shared
with S; B has the KAB and believes that it is shared with A;
A has the KAB and believes that it is shared with B; S and
B realize two-way authentication; B and A realize two-way
authentication.
4.2 Security properties analysis
Firstly, the proposed protocols have the following proper-
ties.
Mutual authentication: By our protocols, S can authen-
ticate A and B respectively from the authentication
request with the random number Na and Nb. Also, A
and B authenticate each other identity through Kab and
Nb. The protocols have mutual authentication property
to make the man-in-the-middle attacks necessarily unsuc-
cessful.
Perfect forward secrecy: Our protocols possess forward
secrecy. An agreed key will not be compromised even if
the other agreed keys derived from the same long-term
keying material in a subsequent run are compromised. By
the proposed protocols, the session key Kab and KEY are
randomly selected, so they are independent among each
protocol execution. Therefore, the compromised keys Kas
and Kbs cannot reveal any previous session keys.
Then, we analyze the proposed protocols under the
following kinds of attacks.
Trivial substitution and replay attack: Replaying attack
means that an adversary first intercepts some commu-
nication data in the currently running of key exchange
protocol run. Then, he replays the intercepted data with
receiver in a future protocol running. The replay attack
does not succeed in the proposed protocols because the
freshness of messages transmitted between participants
are guaranteed by the random nonces Na and Nb. Only
A, B, and S can use the pre-shared key to encrypt the
random nonces. Moreover, the proposed protocols do
not require the time-stamp information to prevent replay
attack which requires extremely imperative precise clock
synchronization.
Man-in-the-middle attack: A man-in-the-middle attack
means that an attacker can intercept, replay, substitute,
or modify the information that is significant to the com-
munication parties. Since all critical messages in the pro-
posed protocols are encrypted to prevent eavesdropping,
it is rarely able tomodify themessages exchanged between
entities. However, if an attacker I eavesdrops the com-
munication channel between A and B, he can replace the
authentication request {Na, A} with {Ni, I}. The replaced
{Ni, I} will be forward to the S together with {Nb, B}. The
attacker can be successfully authenticated by S if he is
really a legitimate user in the system. However, the man-
in-the-middle attack can still not be successful because
the attacker cannot generate a correct {Ni}Kab to respond
to the {Ni, I}. Therefore, we conclude that a man-in-the-
middle attack could not succeed against the proposed
protocols.
Fake base station attack: False base station attack is that
a fake node pretends to be a participant node in the pro-
tocol, to grasp the secret information. For pre-shared key
is only known between A, B, and S in the new protocols,
the transmitted information encrypted by the pre-shared
secret key Kas and Kbs will not be decrypted by illegal
entities. The fake entities do not know the pre-shared
key, thereby it cannot get the resulting session key even-
tually. If the entities decrypt the messages correctly and
obtain the right contents, we can make sure that the iden-
tities of the nodes are legal. Then, the authentication is
accomplished.
5 The performance analysis of the protocols
In this paper, we propose two efficient key exchange
protocols under normal conditions and special condi-
tions, respectively. From the performance perspective,
we mainly concern the computational time and energy
consumption of our protocols. To detail the quantitative
result, we conduct simulations and compare our protocols
with several typical protocols. Firstly, we make detail anal-
ysis of the computation time which is vital to the efficiency
of the protocols. Then, we conclude a discussion of energy
consumption on computation.
5.1 Computation time
In this section, we analyze and test the computation time
associated with the efficiency of protocols.
Simulation environment setup: In this part, we setup a
simulation hardware environment to measure the com-
putation time of the selected schemes. The simulation
environment is a 32-bit Cortex-M3 microcontroller with
72MHz ARM MCU and 512 KB memory. For each
protocol, AES is selected as the secret key encryption
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scheme and SHA256 for hash function. The random
number is generated with three times AES-128 cryp-
tographic algorithm and two times XOR operations.
The simulations are run several times to eliminate the
randomness.
Simulation results: Noting that the computation over-
head of these schemes mainly results from the crypto-
graphic operations, thus the computation time consumed
on the cryptographic operations can be used to approxi-
mate the efficiency of the schemes for the sake of simplic-
ity. Table 1 shows the operating time of each algorithm.
Given the cryptographic operations and their correspond-
ing consuming time, we can calculate the computation
time of each protocol as shown in Table 2. The corre-
sponding figure is shown in Fig. 4.
From the simulations, we can find that the modular
computations still cost much. It is clear that a good design
of authenticated key exchange protocols should adopt
suitable cryptographic operations with less computation
in order to achieve better performance and efficiency. By
comparing with other schemes, the proposed protocols
show a relatively short time among all six schemes. In
other four schemes, the computation time of relay node
are time-consuming and will shorten the lifetime of the
relay nodes which are not suited for WBAN environment.
Therefore, this feature makes our protocols more effec-
tive. Based on these analyses, our schemes show a better
performance in WBAN scenario.
5.2 Energy consumption
In this part, the energy consumption consumed by cryp-
tographic operations is used to evaluate the schemes. This
time, we use a low-processor and 64 MB memory run-
ning Windows Mobile 5.0 for packet pc. According to
PXA270 [23], the typical power consumption of PXA270
in active is 570 mW. Therefore, using the computation
time in Table 3, we can calculate the corresponding energy
consumption. For example, if it takes 0.919 ms to com-
plete a AES-128, the energy consumption is approximately
0.919 ∗ 570/1000 = 0.523 mJ. Similarly, based on Table 2,
the energy consumption of all schemes is calculated as
shown in Table 3. The corresponding figures are shown
in Fig. 5.
Table 1 Computational time
Operations Time(ms)
Secret key encrypt(AES-128) 0.919




Table 2 Different schemes’ computational time
Protocols A B S
(ms) (ms) (ms)
Lu [5] 19.569 19.569 36.141
Yoon [24] 23.377 23.377 27.266
Huang [7] 14.027 14.027 13.973
Lv [25] 16.831 20.686 16.885
Protocol I 9.07 15.968 9.655
Protocol II 9.834 14.894 10.729
Due to the computation energy consumption being pro-
portional to the computational time, we can draw the
same conclusions as the ones in Section 5.1.
5.3 Memory requirement of the protocols
In the protocols, a 2-byte-long node identifier is used to
identify each node in the network, which starts from 0001
and increases on a sequential basis. In Table 4, we can
find that the length of the random numbers generated by
the nodes is 16 bytes, while pre-shared key Kas,Kbs and
session key KEY ,Kab,KAB and KBS are all 16 bytes long.
In the running process of the protocols, each node only
needs to store the node identifier and the relevant ran-
dom numbers, while the control node needs to generate
and store the session keys additionally. The overall mem-
ory cost is no more than 1 KB. The ROM requirement of
ordinary nodes including its identifier and pre-shared key
is no more than 0.145 KB, and the memory requirement
of RAM including random number and session key is no
more than 0.25 KB. The ROM requirement of the control
node including the pre-shared keys is at most 0.125 KB,
and the RAM requirement including two pairs of the ses-
sion key is no more than 0.25 KB. In summary, the overall
Fig. 4 The computational time of different schemes
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Table 3 Different schemes’ computational energy consumption
Protocols A B S
(mJ) (mJ) (mJ)
Lu [5] 11.154 11.154 20.600
Yoon [24] 13.324 13.324 7.594
Huang [7] 7.995 7.995 7.964
Lv [25] 9.593 11.791 9.624
Protocol I 5.169 9.101 5.503
Protocol II 5.605 8.489 6.115
memory requirement is quite small, which conforms to
the limited capacity of WBAN nodes.
- The proposed protocol I : the total message size of
the scheme is equal to
|A+Na| + |B| + |Ebs{A + B + Na + Nb}| + |Eas{B+
Na+Kab}| + |Ebs{A+Nb+Kab +KEY }| + |Eas{B+
Na + Kab}| + |Kab{Na + Nb}| + |Eab{Nb}| Here, | ∗ |
denotes the size of ′∗′ in byte. Ec(∗) represents the
AES encryption algorithm calculated for the contents
inside the bracket with c. The total message size of
protocol I is 274 bytes.
- The proposed protocol II : the total message size of
the scheme is equal to
|B + Nb| + |A + Nb + Na| + |Eas{A + B + Na}| +
|B| + |Ebs{Eas{A + Na + B} + Nb + A}| + |Ebs{A +
Nb + KAB + KBS}| + |Eas{Na + B + KAB}| +
|Eas{Na + B + KAB}| + |EAB{Nb}| + |EAB{Nb + 1}|.
The total message size is 422 bytes.
In the implementation procedure of authentication and
session key generation of the authenticated key exchange
protocols, the communication traffic is constant. That is
to say, the length of messages is consistent. In protocol I
Fig. 5 Energy consumption on computation
Table 4 ROM requirement for keys
ROM (byte)
Identify (A, B) 2
Random number (Na,Nb) 16
Pre-shared key (Kas , Kbs) 16
Session key (KEY , Kab , KAB , KBS) 16
and protocol II, the maximum communication traffic is
no more than 0.5 KB. Communication traffic of the two
protocols is extremely small, so the efficiency is higher.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange
protocols that are suitable for WBANs. The two schemes
are proved to be secure in BAN logic model. The perfor-
mance analysis of them are also given. The analysis results
show that the proposed protocols achieve the expecta-
tive goals and possess several advantages: they provide
favorable security performance and are capable of resist-
ing sundry common attacks to guarantee communication
security; the participants accomplish authentication and
generate session key by five or six steps without tangle-
some cryptographic operation; on account of majority
security protocols utilizing timestamp to guarantee the
freshness of messages, the participants must keep clock
synchronization which is rather untoward and costly.
However, the proposed protocols adopt random number
instead of timestamp, reducing the complexity of the net-
work as well as decreasing the cost. The performance
analysis shows that the protocols have superior running
time performance, less memory costs, and so forth. How
to design more and better protocols for WBANs is the
next target of further research.
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